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North Korea reveals secrets: Nine Corps bloody battle: lack of cotton truth
Interesting history2013-06-28 14:35:36

I. Did Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai make the wrong decision to bring the Nine Corps to the DPRK on November 5?

Regarding the use of the Nine Corps, initially Mao Zedong believed that the Nine Corps could "schedule the Meihekou for training on November 1. If there is a strategic need on the front line, it can be called. If there is no such need, it can't be easily called." After our army appeared on the Korean battlefield, the movement of the US military on the eastern front was uncertain. However, after that, considering the possibility of the U.S. and Puppet troops attacking from Xianxing to the north, Mao Zedong believed that "Song Shilun's main force must be used in this area to be sure, otherwise it will be unfavorable for the whole situation." Trends, Mao Zedong has clearly used the Nine Corps for the Eastern Front. On November 3, Mao Zedong agreed with Peng Dehuai and others, using the 27th Army in the northeast direction of Xinyizhou, while the other two armies of the 9th Corps were resting near Shenyang. At this time, the first battle is coming to an end. In the plan for the next battle of Peng Dehuai, it is still necessary to concentrate on the forces and prepare to be attacked by the 38th Army, 42nd Army, and even 40th Army by Tokugawa. In this way, the East Battlefield must be completely under the responsibility of the Nine Corps, so it is recommended that the Nine Corps enter the DPRK. On November 5th, Mao Zedong reconfirmed that the deployment was very good. "An army of the Ninth Corps should go straight to the river boundary and quickly go to Changjin." At the same time, it wrote to the Li Tao Nine Corps' stand-by and rest positions. At this time, the Nine Corps was prepared to advance into the DPRK with two troops, while the 26th Army was on standby. Peng Dehuai ’s deployment of electric power on November 6 was conceived on the basis of two armies of the Nine Corps. Since then, Mao Zedong believed that the combat effectiveness of the first division of the US Army was said to be the strongest in the US Army. Our army surrounded two regiments with two divisions. It seems that the (strength) is not enough. There should be one or two divisions as reserve teams. Therefore, it was decided to bring the 26th Army to the front.

The above decision-making process shows that Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai made no mistakes in using the Nine Corps. Mao Zedong ’s judgment that the U.S. military may attack from the north to the north is completely correct. If it is not based on this correct judgment and is prepared in advance, it is likely that it is too late to use the nine regiments on the eastern front, so that the second battle may have insufficient strength. . As for some people, it is considered that Peng Dehuai adjusted the Nine Corps to enter the DPRK because of "great joy". "If the Nine Corps rectifies in the Northeast for a period of time and then enters the DPRK, they will receive winter clothes from East China, as well as cars and ammunition supplemented by the Northeast Military Region. "It will be much more beautiful." In fact, even if the Nine Corps dispatched to North Korea so hastily, the time was very tight. The operation of the Corps cannot be passed by everyone, it takes time. In fact, the 20th Army of the Ninth Regiment arrived at the battle area on November 15, the 27th Army reached the battle area on the 17th, and the 26th Army arrived at the designated location as late as 23:00 on the 22nd. The U.S. military has reached the Changjin Lake area on the 23rd and occupied Liutanli. If the 9th Corps of the Volunteer Army had to wait for the winter assembly and resupply of car ammunition, it would not be necessary to fight.

From the point of view of US military operations, if the nine regiments postponed operations for two to three days to supplement winter clothing, the first two armies could barely catch up. Although the winter clothes could not be matched for two days, if some shoes, hats and gloves could be added, it would also reduce the degree of freezing of the army. But the reduction in the battlefield preparation time can be said to have advantages and disadvantages. Looking back, maybe it should be slightly slower for two to three days. According to General Xie Youfa's Collection, Song Shilun had called Gao Gang before crossing the river and proposed to postpone crossing the river for two days. He asked to call Chairman Mao directly to make this proposal, and estimated that Chairman Mao would likely agree. But Gao Gang did not agree with Song to speak directly with Chairman Mao.

Second, which aspect of the Nine Corps' cotton clothing should be prepared? Is it ready and shipped? Why did the army only send thin cotton clothing when the Nine Corps was dispatched?

According to the logistical supply plan of the Northeast Frontier Force on August 26, cotton coats were originally scheduled to be manufactured in the Northeast for 240,000 sets and North China for 100,000 sets. Others, such as the North China Logistics Department, are responsible for 400,000 cotton vests and 160,000 pairs of cotton leather shoes; the East China Logistics Department is responsible for 400,000 cashmere pants, 30,000 pairs of cotton leather shoes; the Central South Logistics Department is responsible for 400,000 cotton coats, and 60,000 cotton leather shoes; The Northeast Logistics Department is responsible for 700,000 pairs of cotton gloves and socks and 400,000 wool hats. East China does not have the task of making cotton clothes.

As of October 18, the Ministry of General Logistics and the Ministry of Finance suggested to the central government that "another 200,000 sets of cotton clothing should be prepared" and "50,000 to be made by the Northeast, North, Central and South China," and Completed in February. It can be seen that at this time, 50,000 sets of cotton clothes should be prepared in East China, and the time limit is in December.

As of October 30, when the 9th Corps was dispatched, Song Shi's turn to the General Logistics Department to find the responsible comrades and the East China Logistics Department's non-peasant to discuss the issue of supply, and raised no cotton coat, but Song did not know why. As a result, the East China Military Region was generated by the General Logistics Department, requiring "East China to be responsible for the supply of cotton and quilts", while Northeast China was responsible for cotton hats, coats, vests, cashmere pants, gloves, socks and cotton shoes, and it was too late due to time. It will not be sent to North Korea to supplement the Corps until December 15. Zhou Enlai's instructions in the general report must be completed within November and cannot be extended to mid-December. At this time, it was only a week before the 9th Corps was dispatched (of course, it was not known at the time), and it was required that East China be fully responsible for the 9th Corps' cotton coats. Even if Chen Yi was a god, it was too late to produce 150,000 sets of cotton coats.

On the one hand, the original plan for the supply of winter clothing for the Ninth Corps should be in Shenyang and Meihekou. After the departure plan was changed, supplies must be transported from Shenyang and Meihekou to Ji'an. Of course, it was too late. More importantly, there is no matching winter clothing in stock in the Northeast. About 13 th Corps had already been distributed for winter clothing, so according to a report by the Northeast Finance Minister Ni Wei on military supply, by the end of November, 400,000 sets of cotton clothing had to be produced. Therefore, when the Nine Corps arrived, they had to give cotton coats. As far as cotton coats are concerned, they have insufficient reserves. Only 641 cotton coats will be issued on November 6th and 7th. On the 8th, the 20th Army arrived in Shenyang and rushed to Huanggutun, 35,090 cotton coats originally intended to be sent to the Thirteen Corps but not removed. At this time, Shenyang's inventory was exhausted. When the 10th Corps Headquarters and the 27th Army arrived in Shenyang, only 2,980 frontier defense coats were made. Gao Gang also ordered that more than 30,000 pieces of the old and new cotton coats allocated by the Ministry of Finance were given to the 27th Army. Since then, the remaining 60,000 (and another 30,000 have been allocated) were also awarded to the 9th Corps (but strangely, the 9th Corps only picked more than 60,000 of the 90,000, and the rest No more). Since then, some cotton coats have been urgently delivered. By the end of November, a total of 226,661 new and old cotton coats were issued to the 9th Corps.

Although there are many cotton coats for collars, they are limited by capacity, and the actual distribution is far less than this. For example, according to a survey by the General Military Department on January 3, 1951, the amount of coats received by the Thirteenth Corps was basically the same as that issued by the Eastern Army. A total of 343,998 were issued, but When I learned about the Forty Army, I didn't get a coat, and the other army was said to have no leader. The logistics capacity of the Nine Corps is insufficient, and distribution is more difficult.

For the Nine Corps, the food issue is even more terrible. It should have been supplied by the two branches of the Donghou organization and the newly formed four branches of the Corps. However, according to the summary of the 20th Army's logistic work summary, after the Corps arrived in Ji'an, the logistics of the Corps had no location and it directly contacted a branch . As a result, the troops entered the DPRK on November 12, and the first train departed on the 18th with 1 million jin of grain, which caused serious consequences of not being able to keep up with the troops. The grain was transported from Ji'an to Qianchuan, and there were more than 300 miles from the front. Army cars suffered heavy losses, and after the soldiers, the cars could not be delivered before, so they were basically unable to supply the front line, causing general starvation. In the worst case of the sixty division, there was no food for three days. Only 2,000 kilograms of food can be received from Longshuipi to the front line. The next chain reaction was that the follow-up supply of the 27th Army could not keep up, because the Corps cars had to give priority to the 20th Army. On November 10th, the 27th Army ’s report on logistical supply reflected that the army ’s vehicles (20) and the Corps ’vehicles (responsible for the supply of the 27th Army ’s 150 should be only 110. The actual amount is calculated here. The actual The difference is farther), all use, once every five days, can only transport 680,000 kilograms (material) each time. The 27th Army requires 170,000 kilograms of food, vegetables and vegetables every day, which is 850,000 kilograms in five days. This does not include the 2.5 million kilograms of ammunition that needs to be transported forward and 200,000 kilograms of other equipment that needs to be replenished. In other words, there is no guarantee that the troops can only eat every day. This is the biggest thing. Therefore, the logistics of the 27th Army believes that the most urgently needed problems are food, followed by warm items, and the most urgent are leather shoes and gloves (not cotton coats. Because cold hands and feet are most likely to be frostbite when fighting in cold areas, and if their hands and feet are frozen, their combat power is lost).

Even vegetables and vegetables are not luxury items. The three units of the Ninth Regiment and the two logistics divisions need 240,000 kilograms of food per day. From the time of entry to the end of December, the amount of more than 9 million kilograms is required. To 5.1 million catties, only 46% of the demand. For example, the 26 and 27 troops supplied by the Second Division need 160,000 kilograms of food per day (one army is calculated based on 80,000 kilograms of food per day). There are 104 vehicles in the second division, which can average up to 100,000 kilograms per day. To lose 2, 3 cars. From the beginning to the end of the campaign, ammunition was shipped with only two bases, and food was stopped when the ammunition was shipped. The rear authorities only calculated theoretically that the organization was properly adjusted to ensure that the supply of grain and ammunition was proved to be inconsistent with reality.

The key to insufficient transportation capacity is the small number of cars and large losses. Volunteer logistics (1st, 2nd, and 3rd divisions) entered the North Koreans with a total of 735 vehicles, and by November 12 they were bombed by enemy aircraft (including more than 20 destroyed vehicles). When Deng Hua mentioned in the article "Preliminary Experience in Fighting US Enemies" the logistics supply of the volunteer army, he also mentioned that the loss of more than 600 vehicles in the 20 days after entering the DPRK. When the Nine Corps entered the DPRK, the demand for vehicles was greater. According to the calculation of the Northeast Military Region Logistics Department, it was calculated based on eleven troops (the artillery division and logistics were each counted as one army), and only food and vegetables were supplied (not including ammunition and gasoline) 1,500 vehicles are needed to ensure that the entire army can eat.

It can be seen from the above that due to the very weak logistical capabilities of the Volunteers in the initial period of entry into the DPRK, and the U.S. military ’s full control of the air, it adopted a policy of devastating bombardment (hundreds of planes and hundreds of rounds of reconnaissance and bombardment every day, at least four or five times at night. A large number of highly incendiary bombs were thrown. Enemy aircraft could fly low enough to break high-voltage utility poles, and low-fly to sweeping cars to load ammunition to explode and destroy the enemy aircraft itself. Therefore, the army ’s most urgently needed supplies and ammunition also faced great difficulties. Winter clothing The problem is naturally even more unsolvable. Although there are reserves in the rear, and the logistics reports from the Northeast Military Region or branch, how many are delivered in front of the logistics, but the number of truly reaching the front line is limited. Even the 13th Corps that entered the DPRK had similar problems, such as complaining in a report from the Logistics Department of the 38th Army on the 21st of December: Talking now, I do n’t know where and when to come. ” One branch supplied the materials for the second battle of the 38th Army. The telegram said how many cars and how many things were sent. In fact, it only received three noodles, seven noodles, and five vehicles. Was intercepted), plus some ammunition, and nothing more. Therefore, for the Nine Corps, being able to eat and play well is the first task, and the limited capacity should first guarantee these two items. It cannot be said that because it was later found that the frostbite was serious, it turned around and thought that the cotton coat problem should be solved first. Because if there is no food (in fact, there have been a large number of hungry rice or even starvation), it will face a more serious situation.

As for the issue that the cotton coats issued by the 9th Corps should be thickened, the logistics department certainly realized it long ago. If you do n’t even know this, would n’t the people in the logistics department eat dry food? Could it be true than those of our amateur netizens who talk on the paper? Simple? As early as August 26, 1950, the Central Military Commission inspected and discussed the preparation work of the Northeast Frontier Defense Forces. Zhang Lingbin reported in his report that, for example, when the southern army moved north, the cotton coats needed to be thickened. But the problem is, after all, the troops were in the south at the time. "If it is thicker now, if the army is not north, if the team is not immediately transferred to the north, it is too inconvenient for them to wear winter clothes distributed by the northeast army. Therefore Zhang Lingbin suggested:" When the Southern Army transferred to the north, a cotton vest and a pair of cashmere pants were issued, and then a coat was sufficient. "

Who is responsible for the winter clothing problem? What are the problems that cannot be solved objectively? What are the problems that can be avoided subjectively?

According to the information on the winter clothing of the Nine Corps listed above, the issue of responsibility should be relatively clear. First of all, from the perspective of prior planning and scheduling, the General Logistics Department does not pay enough attention to the cotton coat problem and fails to pay close attention to it. It is responsible. Due to the initial logistical resupply plan, cotton clothing was returned to Northeast and North China. At that time, it was estimated that 340,000 sets would be completed before September 15. However, by the end of October, a large gap of 400,000 sets was found. It cannot be said that there are problems in the overall planning and implementation. Due to errors in the estimation of the scale and urgency of the war, it was only on October 18th that each district was completed to complete 50,000 sets of cotton clothes, which was limited to December. By October 30th, the Nine Corps had gone north, and then turned to urgently order East China to solve the cotton clothing, of course, it was too late. At the preparatory meeting on August 26, Zhang Lingbin proposed that "the Southern Army should send a cotton vest and a pair of cashmere pants, and then a coat" when it was transferred to the north, which was a serious mistake. As a result, the logistics of the East China Military Region naturally thought that the troops only needed to distribute ordinary cotton clothes, and they could receive cotton coats and other equipment after arriving in the northeast. The Northeast Military Region has only cotton coats, and there is no adequate reserve for cotton coats. After that, when the problem was exposed, Zhang Lingbin accused the East China Military Region based on the opinions of Gao Gang and Li Fuchun, saying that "in the future, all troops deployed in the Northeast must be equipped with Northeast standards and cannot be supplemented by the Northeast. The Song Bingtuan came before and said that the Song Bingtuan was fully equipped. As a result, there were no cotton shoes, cotton hats, thin cotton clothes, and the organization was not sound. From the word "after", it can be seen that there was no "need to press "Complete standard equipment." In this case, the East China Military Region should only issue ordinary cotton coats in accordance with Zhang Lingbin's suggestion, and it should be no problem to wait until it arrives in the northeast.

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